Pay attention to the following pages because understanding this one equation will determine whether your startup venture flies or dies. Yes, I know you're just skimming this, but I guarantee you that if you don't take the time to understand this now, someday your venture will be going broke, and you'll be wondering why.
A business is an engine that attracts customers, delivers something of value to them, and then extracts that value in the form of profits. That's what a business is. It logically follows that the cost of attracting a new customer needs to be less than the value we can extract from that customer. If it costs fifteen dollars in advertising to get a customer, but we can only make seven dollars from that customer, then Houston, we have a problem.
Conversely, if it costs fifteen dollars to get them, and then once they are a customer, they make repeat purchases that yield seventy-five dollars in profit, then you are happy. Ultimately, every venture of every kind has to have a Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC) that is less than the Lifetime Value (LTV) of a customer. It's a simple, self-evident concept, yet failure to accurately project LTV:CAC remains a leading cause of startup death.
Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC) is a very simple concept — it's the amount of money we spend on customer acquisition activities during a given period, divided by the number of new customers acquired during that period. So if we spend $10,000 during the quarter on sales and marketing and we got 1,000 new customers during that period, then our CAC was $10. Easy peasy.
The Lifetime Value (LTV) of a customer is similarly simple in concept. Let's say we sell widgets for $20, and we make $8 in gross profit on each one we sell. Now let's say that the customer buys a widget from us, and then ends up coming back and buying an average of five more widgets from us before they disappear. This means that the average new customer buys a total of six widgets from which we make $8 each in gross profit, so our LTV on that customer is $48. Because math.
Given this example, our widget business is a pretty good one! We are able to get customers for $10, and make $48 from them, which gives us an LTV:CAC ratio of 4.8!
The fact is, a high percentage of startups die because their cost of getting customers turns out to be higher than they can make from them. This is partly just because we're all optimists — we all think our startup is so awesome that people will flock to become customers and will remain customers forever. Eventually, that optimism fades as we realize marketing is expensive and no customer stays forever.
To paraphrase Ernest Hemingway, startups go broke two ways: gradually, and then suddenly.
Investors tend to obsess over LTV:CAC.
Investors care a lot about your LTV:CAC ratio because it's the essence of a successful business. It's also a proxy for their potential ROI. If you have proof that you can spend one dollar on customer acquisition activities and get five dollars in value back (an LTV:CAC ratio of 5.0), investors will want to shovel as much money as possible into that engine. Having a business with an LTV:CAC ratio over 5.0 looks like a just-add-money opportunity to investors.
It's a blunt tool that is better when sharpened.
Let's say that during one quarter, you spent ten thousand dollars on sales and marketing and got one thousand new customers for a CAC of ten dollars. Some of those customers probably came through word of mouth, some as referrals, some from your PR efforts, and some from paid advertising. You had a blended CAC of ten dollars, but that doesn't tell you anything about the relative effectiveness of each of your different customer acquisition efforts.
Not all customers are created equal.
With every business I've ever run, I've realized at some point that eighty percent of our profits were coming from twenty percent of our customers. It's incredible how this tends to be true with almost all businesses. If you look at the LTV of your entire universe of customers, you'll probably see that twenty percent of them have a much higher individual LTV than the rest. Wouldn't you want to focus your CAC efforts on getting more of the high-LTV customers? Yes, you would.
Therefore, cohorts matter.
The two points above would suggest that you really want to track your LTV:CAC ratio by customer cohort. For example, what's the ratio for customers acquired through Facebook advertising versus those acquired through Google advertising? Knowing that would tell you a lot about allocating advertising dollars. What's the LTV:CAC ratio for customers acquired through our referral program? Knowing that would tell you how much you can afford to offer in a referral fee. Your company's blended LTV:CAC indicates the health of the overall engine, but it doesn't tell you how to optimize the engine's performance for the next quarter. Tracking customer cohorts tells you that.
Also, velocity matters.
One afternoon, I sat in the backyard of longtime Silicon Valley venture capitalist Tim Connors as he drew graphs for me on his whiteboard (only VCs have whiteboards in their backyards). He explained that he doesn't care about the LTV:CAC ratio, per se; what he cares about is the velocity with which invested CAC comes back in the form of LTV. He's developed a metric he calls CACD (the D is for "doubled"). CACD answers the question, "If we spend twelve dollars in customer acquisition activities, how long does it take for us to get twenty-four dollars' worth of gross profit back?" As an investor, he wants to see a business with a CACD of less than eight months.
Tim's formula gets to the heart of an inherent flaw in the LTV:CAC ratio: it doesn't include a time factor. A business with an LTV:CAC ratio of 5:1 might seem good at first, but if you have to service a customer for ten years before you make back the money you spent getting that customer, then it doesn't seem so good, right? Velocity matters, so think about how you can measure CACD for your business. Spending twelve dollars where it returns with a high velocity will accelerate your engine of growth (and make Tim happy).